Keith Byrne v. Secretary United States Depart by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-13-2015 
Keith Byrne v. Secretary United States Depart 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Keith Byrne v. Secretary United States Depart" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 724. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/724 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3308 
_____________ 
 
KEITH BYRNE; KEREN BYRNE, 
                                                          Appellants 
 v. 
 
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;  
DIRECTOR UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; 
EVANGELINE KLAPAKIS, FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP  
AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; TONY BRYSON, DISTRICT DIRECTOR,  
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, PHILADELPHIA, PA;  
ROBERT COWAN, DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND  
IMMIGRATION SERVICES NATIONAL BENEFITS CENTER 
 _____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2:13-cv-06953) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel H. Slomsky  
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 23, 2015 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 13, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Keith and Keren Byrne filed a complaint alleging violations of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) and violations of their due process rights by the defendants, the 
Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and various 
other immigration officials.  The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants and the Byrnes appealed.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.  
I. 
 We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts necessary to our 
disposition.  Keith Byrne is a citizen of Ireland who entered the United States in October 
of 2007 under the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”).  Though the VWP permits an entrant 
without a visa to stay in the country for only ninety days, Mr. Bryne has not left the 
country since his entry in 2007.  In October of 2009, Keith Byrne married Keren Byrne, a 
citizen of the United States.   
 In mid-2012, Mrs. Byrne filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on Mr. Byrne’s 
behalf.  Mr. Byrne simultaneously filed an I-485 Application to Register Permanent 
Residence or Adjust Status, an I-765 Application for Employment Authorization, and an 
I-601 Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility.  His papers included the fact 
that he had been twice arrested for possession of marijuana in his native Ireland and on 
both occasions paid a fine.  Mr. Byrne’s counsel, in his cover letter to the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), stated that he was filing the I-601 form 
as a protective measure, “if it is determined that Mr. Byrne is inadmissible . . . for a 
conviction for a controlled substance.”  Appendix (“App.”) 53.  Counsel maintained, 
3 
 
however, that the waiver was not required because Mr. Byrne’s adjudications did not rise 
to the level of “convictions” under the immigration laws.       
 After an interview, USCIS granted Mrs. Byrne’s I-130 petition, but denied Mr. 
Bryne’s I-485 application.  USCIS found that Mr. Byrne’s two marijuana possession 
offenses rendered him inadmissible to the United States.  USCIS also denied his I-601 
application for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  Section 
1182(h) allows DHS to waive inadmissibility for someone who is inadmissible because 
of “a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana,” and Mr. 
Byrne had two offenses.  Mr. Byrne requested removal proceedings and was denied.1   
 The Byrnes then filed a complaint in the District Court on November 29, 2013.  
The complaint alleged violations of the APA and of the Byrnes’ due process rights.  The 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, and the 
Byrnes filed what they denominated a cross-motion for summary judgment.  On June 17, 
2014, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.     
II. 
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 704 and 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.2  We have appellate jurisdiction over that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
                                              
1 Aliens admitted under the VWP waive their right to contest removal, except on the basis 
of asylum, as a condition of entry.  8 U.S.C. § 1187(b)(2). 
 
2 Though 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) has a jurisdiction-stripping provision, which provides that 
no court has jurisdiction to review the decision “to grant or deny a waiver under this 
subsection,” the District Court had jurisdiction over Mr. Byrne’s claim because DHS 
decided he was ineligible for a waiver, rather than declining to grant a waiver for which 
he was eligible.  See Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 203 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that 
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 “When reviewing a grant of summary judgment in a case brought under the APA, 
we apply de novo review to the district court’s ruling, and in turn apply the applicable 
standard of review to the underlying agency decision.”  Cyberworld Enter. Techs., Inc. v. 
Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 195–96 (3d Cir. 2010).  We exercise plenary review of the 
District Court’s statutory interpretation.  See Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 222 (3d 
Cir. 2003).     
III. 
   We begin by briefly setting out the basic statutory framework governing this 
case.  An alien who marries a United States citizen is eligible to request an adjustment of 
status on that basis.  The alien may nonetheless be inadmissible because of a controlled 
substance violation.  As applicable to Mr. Byrne, the statute provides that “any alien 
convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which 
constitute the essential elements of . . . a violation of . . . any law or regulation of . . . a 
foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . is inadmissible.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A).  The statute also provides for the waiver of inadmissibility insofar as the 
conduct that rendered the alien inadmissible “relates to a single offense of simple 
possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana.”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
 Mr. Byrne first claims that he was improperly denied an adjustment of status 
because his two marijuana violations do not satisfy the terms of 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A).  He argues, essentially, that the violations do not rise to the level of 
                                                                                                                                                  
an appellate court may review the determination that an immigrant is “legally ineligible” 
for a benefit but not the discretionary denial of an eligible immigrant’s application for the 
benefit). 
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“convictions” as defined by the statute.  Though the subsection’s heading does say 
“Conviction of certain crimes,” its text is substantially broader and “it is a ‘well-settled 
rule of statutory interpretation that titles and section headings cannot limit the plain 
meaning of statutory text where that text is clear.’”  United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 
299, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State–Operated Sch. Dist., 344 F.3d 
335, 348 (3d Cir. 2003)).  The text refers not only to acts which an alien is “convicted 
of,” but also to acts that an alien “admits having committed,” and to a situation where the 
alien admits to a course of conduct which “constitute[s] the essential elements of” a 
relevant violation.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).   
 We have no trouble concluding that Mr. Byrne, at the least, “admit[ted] having 
committed . . . a violation of . . . [a] law or regulation of . . . a foreign country relating to 
a controlled substance.”  Id.  His I-601 form admits the violations and the record shows 
that the Irish police viewed the two offenses as convictions under Ireland’s Misuse of 
Drugs Act, a law of a foreign country relating to controlled substances.  Mr. Byrne 
contends Ireland did not provide him the same constitutional protections he would have 
in the United States, but that does not factor into our analysis of whether he is 
inadmissible under the plain terms of the statute.   
 Mr. Byrne also argues that because the USCIS letter denying his I-601 application 
referred to “convictions,” the Government may not now support that decision on the 
grounds that his conduct amounted to a “violation,” even if it was not a conviction.  It is 
well settled “that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which 
an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such 
6 
 
action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”  SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 
194, 196 (1947).     
 The Chenery doctrine, however, is not so technical as to require the precise 
phrasing of “violation” rather than “conviction” where the letter sent to Mr. Byrne by 
USCIS was sufficient to put him on notice as to the statutory ground invoked to support 
the denial of his application.  The letter to Mr. Byrne denying his I-601 application sets 
out the statute in full, including the “violation” language, and puts him on notice as to the 
ground for denial.  The ground for denying Mr. Byrne’s application was plainly the 
section of the statute governing the admissibility of aliens who have violated controlled 
substances laws.  The fact that the letter describes Mr. Byrne’s conduct as a “conviction” 
does not disguise the basis for the agency’s action nor does it limit our review to consider 
only whether the charged conduct amounts to a conviction.  The major purposes of the 
Chenery doctrine are to allow an agency to consider a matter within its realm of expertise 
in the first instance and to ensure that we have a reasoned decision to review.  Neither 
purpose would be served by requiring remand to the agency “when it ‘would be an idle 
and useless formality.’”  Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting NLRB v. Wyman–Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969)).   
 Mr. Byrne also argues that the District Court erred in rejecting his argument that 
removal amounts to an unconstitutional punishment.  Mr. Byrne is not yet the subject of a 
removal proceeding — his action challenges only USCIS’s denial of his I-495 and I-601 
applications.  This issue, therefore, is not ripe for our consideration because it is not “‘of 
sufficient immediacy and reality’ to justify judicial resolution.”  Peachlum v. City of 
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York, Pa., 333 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific 
Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).   
 We would nevertheless affirm the District Court’s judgment even if we considered 
the argument on the merits.  While the potential for removal is a severe consequence of 
the denial of Mr. Byrne’s applications, is it not a penalty for the purposes of the Eighth 
Amendment.  We have previously held that just “[a]s removal cannot violate the Eighth 
Amendment because it is not a criminal punishment, the denial of an I-130 Petition no 
doubt cannot do so.”  Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation and 
quotation omitted).  We see no reason to distinguish between the denial of an I-130 
Petition and the denial of the I-485 and I-601 applications in this case.  Mr. Byrne’s 
ineligibility for admission to the United States is a severe, but collateral, consequence of 
his violations of Irish law, not a punishment to which the Eighth Amendment has any 
application.  Our conclusion that his removal does not constitute punishment also 
disposes of Mr. Byrne’s argument that this alleged punishment violates the requirement 
of proportionality.  In addition, we agree with the District Court that the relevant statutory 
provisions contain no ambiguity requiring the application of the rule of lenity.  See 2014 
WL 2742800, at *5 n.12      
   Mr. Byrne also argues that USCIS was wrong to conclude that he was ineligible 
for a waiver of his convictions.  The statute provides that the Attorney General may 
“waive the application” of the section governing inadmissibility based on a controlled 
substance violation “insofar as it relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 
grams or less of marijuana.”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  Mr. Byrne argues that each controlled 
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substance violation results in one “application” of the inadmissibility provision and, 
therefore, each violation can be separately waived.   
 We disagree.  The plain language of the statute allows a waiver only for “a single 
offense.”  Id.  To allow an applicant to receive multiple waivers, each for a single 
offense, would allow an end-run around the statutory scheme.  Caselaw in both our 
Circuit and others confirms our interpretation of the statute.  See Steele v. Blackman, 236 
F.3d 130, 134 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that a waiver is unavailable where an applicant 
“admitted to committing more than one offense for which he could be found 
inadmissible”); Rana v. Holder, 654 F.3d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that an alien 
who had received one waiver for a marijuana conviction was ineligible for a second 
waiver under the “single offense” language).    
 Finally, we reject Mr. Byrne’s argument that the VWP program does not limit his 
ability to challenge USCIS’s finding of inadmissibility.  In fact, 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b)(1) 
provides that a VWP entrant waives the right to challenge an immigration officer’s 
determination as to the alien’s inadmissibility “at the port of entry into the United States,” 
and, as noted by the District Court, USCIS policy also provides that applicants who are 
refused an adjustment of status are similarly not entitled to appeal or review, other than 
on the basis of an application for asylum.  See 2014 WL 2742800, at *8 n.19. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
